Add to ORKGThis paper examines efficiency rationales behind uniformity of taxation for public projects. Let a benevolent risk neutral 'constitutional designer' to set an optimal cost-sharing rule for a legislature operating under majority rule. Then the designer will choose 'more equal taxes' for a country with more homogeneous tastes, which is in accord with a popular view. Higher quality projects provide an additional reason for this choice. Moreover, an exogenous requirement to use broader supermajority may also lead to more uniformity.public goods, cost sharing, constitutional design
The implications of equal sacrifice taxation have only been pursued in a very narrow context. This n...
We treat fiscal equalisation as an insurance device against regional tax revenue variance. This insu...
A review of the theoretical literature on optimal indirect taxation reveals that analytical argument...
Public spending, its size and composition, has been studied extensively in the public finance litera...
We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax r...
Literature has long learned about the welfare improving effect of equal-ization in tax competition e...
Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation-that is, a single rate applicable to all income l...
Abstract: This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax com-petition through pub...
This paper asks whether there can be unanimous support for a fiscal constitution that includes tax e...
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing...
The paper compares universal social programs with targeted social benefits. We define "universa...
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to whi...
We compare universal social programs with targeted social benefits. We define 'universality' as sepa...
Since a society’s tax system is one of its most basic and essential social institutions, the justice...
This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by u...
The implications of equal sacrifice taxation have only been pursued in a very narrow context. This n...
We treat fiscal equalisation as an insurance device against regional tax revenue variance. This insu...
A review of the theoretical literature on optimal indirect taxation reveals that analytical argument...
Public spending, its size and composition, has been studied extensively in the public finance litera...
We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax r...
Literature has long learned about the welfare improving effect of equal-ization in tax competition e...
Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation-that is, a single rate applicable to all income l...
Abstract: This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax com-petition through pub...
This paper asks whether there can be unanimous support for a fiscal constitution that includes tax e...
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing...
The paper compares universal social programs with targeted social benefits. We define "universa...
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to whi...
We compare universal social programs with targeted social benefits. We define 'universality' as sepa...
Since a society’s tax system is one of its most basic and essential social institutions, the justice...
This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by u...
The implications of equal sacrifice taxation have only been pursued in a very narrow context. This n...
We treat fiscal equalisation as an insurance device against regional tax revenue variance. This insu...
A review of the theoretical literature on optimal indirect taxation reveals that analytical argument...